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Summary
UN-authorized intervention in Libya in 2011 was a textbook il-
lustration of R2P principles. But the operation and aftermath 
also prove the need for legitimacy criteria to guide decisions on 
authorizing and overseeing international military intervention 
to avoid abuse and mission creep. The emerging players have 
particular responsibilities to ensure that vulnerable groups are 
protected from predations by brutish rulers domestically; weak 
countries are protected from the predations of regional or glo-
bal major powers; and violators of both sets of norms on the use 
of force are made to answer for their transgressions. Develop-
ing countries should be the main participants in the debate over 
R2P, including when, where and how it should be implemented. 
Critics, especially the emerging powers, should emulate the 
Brazilian example to engage with R2P and seek to improve the 
means and manner of implementing the norm.
The use of force, no matter how benevolent, enlight-
ened and impartial in intent, has empirical conse-
quences. It shapes the struggle for power and helps to 
determine the outcome of that political contest. This 
is why it is inherently controversial, contentious and 
contested. Libya was the first road test of the coercive 
Pillar Three of the responsibility to protect (R2P). Its 
invocation was almost a textbook illustration of R2P 
principles. But its implementation proved the need for 
legitimacy criteria to guide decisions on authorizing 
and overseeing international military intervention. Al-
though successful, the Libyan operation proved con-
troversial and contested and the price of over-reach 
there has been paid by Syrians. However, it is prema-
ture to conclude that R2P has morphed into RIP.
International Relations is shaped by the interplay of 
power and ideas. The global rebalancing underway 
embraces military, geopolitical, economic and even 
moral adjustments to the shifts in power, wealth, in-
fluence and ideas of good governance and civic virtue. 
Westerners have lost their previous capacity to set 
standards and rules of behaviour for the whole world. 
As Brazil, China and India, among others, emerge as 
important growth centres in the world economy, the 
age of the West disrespecting the rest’s role, relevance 
and voice is ebbing. But, reversing the direction of 
analysis, so far the signs are that the new global play-
ers are more interested in the status and trappings of 
power than in assuming the burdens of leadership 
that come with the territory. Nor is it clear that they 
have the institutional capacity to connect national as-
pirations of rapid economic development and political 
stability to breaking global gridlocks on such issues as 
democratization, political and market freedoms, civil 
liberties and human rights.
Yet the emerging players – more than any other group 
of states – will have to ensure that, through global gov-
ernance mechanisms and international accountability 
instruments:
1. Vulnerable groups are protected from predations by 
brutish rulers domestically;
2. Weak countries are protected from the predations 
of regional or global major powers; and
3. Violators of both sets of norms on the use of force 
are made to answer for their transgressions.
Preamble
Three preliminary comments are in order by way of 
a preamble. First, interventions were frequent before 
R2P was formulated in 2001 and are not guaranteed 
after R2P’s unanimous adoption in 2005. The choice 
therefore is not if intervention, but whether the in-
tervention will be ad hoc or rules based, unilateral or 
multilateral, and divisive or consensual. R2P helps to 
shift the balance towards interventions that are rules 
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based, multilateral and consensual. To that extent it 
will help the world to be better prepared normatively, 
organizationally and operationally to deal with crises 
of humanitarian atrocities as, when and wherever they 
arise, without guaranteeing any sort of good outcome.
Second, the debate over R2P is not and ought not to 
be a North–South issue. But it can be turned into one 
either because of wilful – and sometimes self-serving 
– obstinacy on the part of key emerging countries; 
or because of calculated neglect of their legitimate 
concerns by a declining West. Many non-Western so-
cieties have a historical tradition of reciprocal rights 
and obligations that bind sovereigns and subjects. 
As argued by ICISS co-chair Mohamed Sahnoun, in 
many ways R2P is a distinctly African contribution to 
global human rights.1 Asia too has its own rich tradi-
tions that vest sovereigns with responsibility for the 
lives and welfare of their subjects while circumscrib-
ing the exercise of power with the majesty of law that 
stands above the agents of the state. In India, Emperor 
Ashoka (3rd Century BC) inscribed the following mes-
sage on a rock edict: “this is my rule: government by 
the law, administration according to the law, gratifica-
tion of my subjects under the law, and protection [sic] 
through the law.”2 
Third, the ground realities are such that the only 
likely sites and targets of intervention in the foresee-
able future will be developing countries. It is the peo-
ple in developing countries therefore who will suffer if 
mass atrocities are being committed and outsiders 
refuse or fail to help; or if interventions are primarily 
geopolitical or commercial in motivation rather than 
humanitarian. Conversely, they will be the principal 
beneficiaries if interventions are motivated mainly 
by humanitarian concerns and executed responsibly. 
But the interveners could be from among the powerful 
countries within developing or advanced countries, or 
a combination of them, acting in their regions or even 
globally. Therefore the conversations on R2P should 
be primarily among developing country governments 
and civil society, but also between them and the in-
dustrialized countries, in order to forge shared under-
standings and common norms and standards of good 
international citizenship consistent with contempo-
rary principles of national and global good govern-
ance. The relevance and importance of this seems to 
be surprisingly ignored in New York and many opin-
ion capitals/journals, with a near exclusive dominance 
of Western names and voices.3 
In summary, the developing countries, China and Rus-
sia were hostile to the “humanitarian intervention” 
agenda in 1999, remained suspicious of “humanitari-
an intervention” within grudging acceptance of R2P in 
2001, gave R2P cautious approval in 2005, grew more 
comfortable with it from 2005 to 2011, in Libya were 
upset with the unchecked implementation rather than 
the principle of R2P, and have been far more circum-
spect about invoking it in Syria in consequence.
Between Unilateral Intervention and Institutionalized 
Indifference
R2P is the normative instrument of choice for convert-
ing a shocked international conscience into decisive 
collective action – for channelling individual moral in-
dignation into collective policy remedies – to prevent 
and stop atrocities. In the decades after 1945, the na-
ture of armed conflict was transformed as interstate 
warfare between uniformed armies gave way to irregu-
lar conflict between rival armed groups. The nature of 
the state too departed from its idealized European ver-
sion. Many communist and some newly-decolonized 
countries were internal security states whose regimes 
ruled through terror, often propped up by the US na-
tional security state. Increasingly, the principal victims 
of both types of violence were civilians. Advances in 
telecommunications brought the full horror of their 
plight into the world’s living rooms. In the meantime, 
the goals of promoting human rights and democratic 
governance, protecting civilian victims of humanitar-
ian atrocities and punishing governmental perpetra-
tors of mass crimes became more important.
R2P spoke eloquently to the need to change the UN’s 
normative framework in line with the changed reality 
of threats and victims. In the vacuum of responsibil-
ity for the safety of the marginalized, stigmatized and 
dehumanized out-group subject to mass atrocities, 
R2P provides an entry point for the international com-
munity to step in and take up the moral and military 
slack. Pared down to its essence, R2P is the acceptance 
of a duty of care by all those who live in zones of safety 
towards those trapped in zones of danger. It strikes a 
balance between unilateral interference rooted in the 
arrogance of power and institutionalized indifference 
that dislocates the “Other” from the Self.
The practice of intervention – and the belief that this 
is in the best interests of the natives who will warmly 
welcome and benefit from it ¬– has a long but not nec-
essarily distinguished lineage. We were successful in 
repositioning the international consensus because we 
rejected the language and discourse of “humanitarian 
intervention.” During our intense and extensive con-
sultations in 2001, we quickly discovered the visceral 
hostility to any so-called right of humanitarian inter-
vention across the developing world rooted in their 
historical encounter with the West in the era of coloni-
alism. To dismiss their claims is to deny their history 
and disrespect their collective memory.
1 “Africa: Uphold Continent’s Contribution to Human Rights, 
Urges Top Diplomat,” allAfrica.com, 21 July 2009 (http://alla-
frica.com/stories/printable/200907210549.html).
2 Quoted in Stanley Wolpert, A new history of India, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1977, 66–67.
3 A Carnegie roundtable on R2P after Libya, for example, includ-
ed only five Westerners; Ethics & International Affairs 25:3 (Fall 
2011).
3R2P was published in December 2001 and endorsed 
by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change in 2004 and by UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan in 2005. Its unanimous endorsement by world 
leaders in 2005 added clarity, rigor and specificity, 
limiting the triggering events to war crimes, genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and so 
realigning the emerging global political norm to exist-
ing categories of international legal crimes.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s four special re-
ports (2009–2012) have sustained and consolidated 
the new international consensus on the subject. Civil 
society organizations have promoted a vigorous proc-
ess of R2P norm socialization and crystallization. The 
annual debates by the UN General Assembly on Ban’s 
special reports have helped to forge a shared under-
standing of R2P to distinguish it from humanitarian 
intervention and align it with building capacity to help 
states exercise their sovereignty more effectively.
Libya 2011
Both the potential mobilizing power and the limita-
tions of R2P as a call to international arms were dem-
onstrated in Libya in 2011. Carefully crafted both to au-
thorize and delimit the scope of intervention, Security 
Council Resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) specified the 
purpose of military action as humanitarian protection 
and limited the means to that goal. NATO ignored the 
restrictions to target Gaddafi directly in a transparent 
effort at regime change, spurned hints of any willing-
ness by the Gaddafi regime to negotiate a ceasefire, 
intervened in the internal civil war and broke the UN’s 
arms embargo by supplying weaponry to the rebels. If 
1973 restrictions had been respected, the civil war and 
the international intervention could well have been 
longer, more protracted, messier and prolonged the 
misery for everyone concerned. Ignoring them may 
thus well have been justified on the logic of military 
necessity and efficiency. But the insistence by some 
NATO powers that they fully adhered to UN-author-
ised “all necessary measures” to protect civilians and 
civilian-populated areas is not credible. Their denials 
rest on “legal sophistries.”4 All the BRICS countries 
objected strongly to the shift from the politically neu-
tral posture of civilian protection to the partial goal of 
assisting the rebels and pursuing regime change.
Moreover, ongoing volatility and violence continue to 
cast a long shadow over post-Gaddafi Libya’s stability 
and commitment to a liberal democratic culture. With 
the capture and killing of Gaddafi, hard questions, 
unasked so as not to complicate the push for victory, 
came to the fore. Who are the rebels? What do they 
stand for? For whom do they speak? How much popu-
lar support do they command? How committed are 
they to eschewing rule by terror?
Syria 2012
The questions are relevant to the Syrian crisis. By the 
end of 2011 the peaceful Arab Spring had mutated into 
a bloody armed uprising and then a full-fledged civ-
il war in 2012 in Syria, in which upwards of 30,000 
people have been killed. Possible courses of action in 
Syria cannot be contemplated without acknowledging 
that the crisis is also about relations with Iran, Russia 
and China, and that the caution about another West-
ern invasion of yet another Muslim country deepened 
with the low odds of success and the good odds of 
unintended-cum-perverse consequences in attacking 
a more formidable enemy in a more volatile strategic 
environment.
China and Russia remain resolutely opposed to any 
resolution that could set in train a sequence of events 
leading to a 1973-type authorization for outside military 
operations in Syria. They warn that such a resolution 
would put Syria on the path to civil war; the Security 
Council is not in the business of imposing the param-
eters of an internal political settlement on member 
states and dictating to them who stays in power and 
who must go; opposition groups too must be con-
demned for perpetrating violence (the moral hazard 
argument) and exhorted to engage constructively with 
the government; the draft resolutions would have in-
flamed, not calm the situation; and the only solution 
to the Syrian crisis is through an inclusive, Syrian-led 
process to address the legitimate aspirations of the 
people in an environment free of violence and human 
rights abuses. While there are unquestionably strate-
gic and economic imperatives behind Russia’s policy 
in particular, the strength of the Sino–Russian opposi-
tion also reflects a conflict of political approaches and 
a rejection of armed domestic confrontation backed by 
international enablers.
India and South Africa have emphasized the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council to renounce vio-
lence in any form in favour of resolving internal dif-
ferences through peaceful means. They noted that the 
draft October 2011 resolution failed to condemn the 
violence perpetrated by the rebels and to require them 
to engage with the government in seeking a peaceful 
solution through political processes. Both voted in fa-
vour of the draft resolution on February 2012. The Del-
hi Declaration (March 2012) signalled growing self-
consciousness by the five BRICS that they have global 
weight and mean to begin using it. It emphasized the 
importance of peaceful transition and diplomatic dia-
logue in “a Syrian-led inclusive process” that respects 
its independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.
4  Jonathan Eyal, “The Responsibility to Protect: A Chance Missed,” 
in Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen, eds, Short War, Long Shad-
ows: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libyan Cam-
paign (London: Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall Report 
1-12, 2012), 59.
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The debate on how best to operationalize R2P requires 
a respectful conversation among proponents and 
sceptics over when, how and by whom to execute the 
international responsibility to protect. The consensus 
on R2P in ICISS in 2001 and at the UN in and since 
2005 resulted from a genuine North–South dialogue. 
Had R2P merely repackaged the Western humanitari-
an warriors’ wishes and brushed aside the sensitivities 
of the formerly colonized, it never would have gained 
rapid uptake and traction culminating in unanimous 
endorsement by world leaders in 2005.
The R2P consensus underpinning Resolution 1973 
was damaged by gaps in expectation, communication 
and accountability between those who mandated the 
operation and those who executed it. Brazil offered a 
paper on “Responsibility while Protecting” with the 
potential to bring in some agreed parameters on the 
conditions that will govern the use of UN-authorized 
R2P operations. Its two key elements are to formulate 
an agreed set of criteria or guidelines to help the Se-
curity Council in the debate before an R2P military 
intervention is authorized, in order to achieve consen-
sus; and a monitoring or review mechanism to ensure 
that the Council has an oversight role over the opera-
tion during implementation, in order to sustain that 
consensus.
As exemplified in the Brazilian initiative, critics should 
engage with R2P and seek to improve the means and 
manner of implementing the norm. This way, the 
Southern players will become joint and responsible 
stakeholders in the emerging new world order. As 
long as the rising new powers remain more concerned 
with consolidating their national power aspirations 
than developing the norms and institutions of global 
governance, they will remain incomplete powers, lim-
ited by their own narrow ambitions, with their mate-
rial grasp being longer than their normative reach.
Conclusion
The collision of different UN Charter norms produced 
the heated and tense debates over “humanitarian in-
tervention” in 1999. Reframing “humanitarian inter-
vention” as the responsibility to protect re-established 
an international consensus. However, the implemen-
tation of the sharp, military end of Pillar Three in Lib-
ya last year shows that the global consensus on R2P 
is tenuous and fragile, not robust and resilient. Above 
all, the Libyan example shows that success in an R2P 
intervention is no more self-guaranteeing than in any 
other type of external intervention. Good intentions is 
not a magical formula by which to shape good out-
comes in foreign lands. On the contrary, there is no 
humanitarian crisis so grave that an outside military 
intervention cannot make it worse. The use of military 
force must always – always – be the option of last resort, 
not the tool of choice for dealing with threatened or 
occurring atrocities.  Equally, however, it must be the 
option of last resort; it cannot be taken off the table.
